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Introduction 
 
Corruption has played a dramatic role in contemporary Italian democracy. Indeed, anti-
corruption investigations in the early 1990s revealed the existence of a complex web of corrupt 
networks involving high-level bureaucrats, entrepreneurs and politicians. The degree and 
pervasiveness of corrupt practices that emerged from the ‘Bribesville’ investigations had an 
unprecedented impact on the country’s institutional and social environment.  
At first sight, the Italian context after the early 1990s turmoil appears as a particularly 
favorable one in terms of the development of anti-corruption policies. First, after the 
“Bribesville” investigations revealed the pervasive and high levels of corruption, the latter 
became one of the most extensively covered issues on the public agenda. This favors, according 
to several scholars, the adoption of policies promoting greater transparency and control 
mechanisms.
1
 Second, new political actors emerged, a new party system formed, and a new 
electoral law was adopted that transformed electoral competition to a bipolar pattern of party 
competition with government alternation. This enabled Italian citizens, for the first time in the 
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country’s political history, to “throw the rascals out,” thus preventing hitherto politically 
dominant forces from perpetuating governmental power. Third, the turnover of the political 
personnel that took place after the 1990s scandals should have allowed for greater leeway for the 
introduction of policy reforms. Finally, at the supranational level, international ‘integrity 
warriors’ organizations started more actively pressuring national member states to introduce 
more thoughtful, coherent, and effective anti-corruption policies.  
Yet, when looking into its evolution after the early 1990s investigations, corruption in 
Italy appears to have increased rather than lowered. Observing Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI), we find that corruption levels, as perceived by analysts, 
country experts, journalists and entrepreneurs, increased over-time, accounting under the most 
recent measurements for the lowest score records.
2
 Recent Eurobarometer surveys point to 
similar results: in the 2009 Special Eurobarometer survey, 83 per cent of Italian respondents 
considered corruption as a major problem in Italy, a percentage increased to 97, in the recently 
issued 2014 Special Eurobarometer.
3
 Beyond perceptions and surveys, in 2012 yet a new wave 
of political corruption scandals in relation illicit use of public funds emerged in the country, 
further de-legitimating Italian political elites. This chapter will explore the reasons for these 
outcomes. Why has Italy remained so corrupt? Does the problem lie in the legislation, or in the 
lack thereof, or rather is there a problem with the legal enforcement? 
To answer these questions we will analyze how domestic and supranational factors have 
accounted for the implementation processes of anti-corruption policies in relation to two key 
corruption-sensitive areas: corruption in public administration and political party finance. The 
period of investigation starts in 1992, when the combined effects of the widespread ‘Bribesville’ 
scandals and the risk of state bankruptcy following the expulsion of the Lira’s from the European 
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Monetary System fuelled popular revolt against the traditional parties, expressed in their collapse 
at the polls and in the overwhelming victory of the “Yes” vote in two referenda that profoundly 
reshaped the electoral system. It ends in 2013 when Italy faced a new political crisis epitomized 
by the advent of the “technical government” chaired by Mario Monti (November 2011 - April 
2013), and by an electoral round in 2013 in which a newly formed anti-system party (Il 
Movimento 5 Stelle, or “Five Stars Movement”) turned out as the first single most voted political 
party in the Chamber of Deputies, leading to a hung Parliament.  
The introduction to the current volume suggested that what underlies the inclination of 
those in authority to respect the boundaries of their power is an entrenched notion of what is 
proper and what strays from acceptable behavior. This sense is conveyed by various laws, 
customs, and institutions, all of which tend to change over time. But the precise form is not the 
primary determinant: instead, it is the general approbation of those who stray from the norms and 
the penalties imposed upon them. The argument we shall present confirms this claim. It shows 
that the prevalence of corruption in Italy does not reflect the absence of laws, or of public 
awareness. Rather, the law does not extract high penalties and public opinion does not act as 
pressure for a shift in behavior.  And as long as this is not corrected, no reform will avail.   
 
Shaping Reform in a Changing Environment: Institutional Legacies, Patterns of 
Competition and Public Attitudes 
 
Notwithstanding fragmentation and polarization, the Italian party system was 
characterized for over forty years from the end of the Second World War by stability.
4
 Sustained 
by the high incidence of the ‘vote of belonging’ and by deeply-rooted linkages with society and 
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its sub-cultures, Italian political parties could rely on a stable electoral support, with 
comparatively low figures of volatility.
5
 The traditional stability of the Italian party system 
experienced a radical earthquake in the early 1990s, which transformed the institutional 
landscape to an unprecedented degree. The origins of this radical and profound turnover of the 
ruling class have been widely discussed in the literature.
6
 The adoption of a new electoral law in 
1993 for both Chambers of the Italian parliament, replacing a form of proportional representation 
with a mixed plurality-PR system, and the end of the cold war and the collapse of international 
Communist regimes, played a major role in changing the format and functioning of Italy’s party 
system. Yet, the country’s profound changes cannot be understood without reference to a third 
crucial factor, namely, the revelations of Italy’s widespread and pervasive system of political 
corruption and illegal party financing involving the country’s largest political parties.
7
 Not only 
the did the 1992-1994 anti-corruption investigations exert a tremendous influence on the Italian 
party system, erasing traditional electoral competitors to the extent that little had remained in 
terms of the party families characterizing the country’s historical development since 1948; 
political scandals also prompted a dramatic crisis of legitimacy of the Italian political parties.
8
 
The aim of this chapter is to investigate the influence these transformations have had on 
anticorruption policies and political finance reforms. We will argue that the conditions sustaining 
anti-corruption efforts in Italy are only favorable on the surface. Drawing on the theory 
developed by O’Dwyer,
9
 we propose a more nuanced understanding of the domestic context, 
analyzing how government disposition towards reforms in these two corruption sensitive areas is 
shaped by the interaction between three main factors: institutional legacy, patterns of political 
competition, and public attitudes. According to O’Dwyer, in a context such as that of Italy,  
marked by the institutional legacy of a weak state, low trust towards representative institutions, 
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and enduring fragmentation of the party system, path dependent patterns of state capture would 
be reproduced. Institutional legacy provides parties the means to exploit the administration as 
weak state structures lack the professional autonomy and legitimacy to resist the encroachment 
of political elites attempting to control public resources.
10  In a context of low trust towards 
representative institutions and weakly developed party loyalties, party members who are not 
motivated by the lure of public office are too few to develop an organizational structure on the 
ground extending beyond public offices. The absence of long-run incentives for mass 
membership predisposes public office holders to exploit the weakness of the state in order to 
extract public resources needed to carry out expensive capital-intensive campaigns.
11
 The legacy 
of a weak state and the demobilization of society are necessary, but insufficient to produce state 
exploitation. If party system institutionalization produces both coherent governing coalitions and 
credible oppositions, then mechanisms of vertical accountability discipline governing parties by 
allowing voters to punish or reward them. In the absence of party system institutionalization, the 
general instability of party organizations shortens the time horizons of governing coalition 
members, who are likely to capture organizational advantage from the state by means of 
corruption. Additionally, we provide a more thorough understanding of reform context including 
supranational influences. As we shall see in the empirical analysis, since the 1990s an ever 
increasing impetus for governmental efforts to implement anticorruption policy and political 
finance reforms has been provided by international organizations.  
Building on our understanding of reform context, we test three alternative scenarios. The 
first, hypothesized by O’Dwyer, involves a context marked by the weak policy legacy with 
regard to anti-corruption framework, by the low trust towards representative institutions, and by 
enduring fragmentation of the party system, path dependent patterns of state capture would be 
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reproduced. In the second scenario, mounting international pressures would outweigh the 
relevance of policy legacy, public attitudes and party system fragmentation, eventually 
disrupting path-dependent patterns of state capture. In the third, as hypothesized through the 
process sequencing approach,
12
 circles of reactions and counter-reactions triggered by the 
interaction between international pressures for change and path-dependent patterns would induce 
an incremental change. Before presenting the evolution of reform processes, we will briefly 
discuss the core features of the Italian domestic context, in terms of institutional legacy, 
changing patterns of political competition, and public attitudes. 
 
Institutional Legacy 
 
The Italian administrative system has long displayed the features typical of the Southern 
European bureaucratic model:
13
 the absence of an autonomous administrative elite equipped with 
an esprit des corps; the entrenched organizational fragmentation of the public sector at both the 
central and the local level; the lack of mechanisms for policy coordination; the vicious circle 
between distrust in public officials and legalism focusing the administrative activity on detailed 
rule following and pervasive legal control by administrative courts with the paradoxical effect of 
increasing opportunities for corruption in the application of cumbersome provisions.
14
 The 
weakness of public bureaucracies was exploited by the governing political parties emerged after 
the Second World War to pursue a strategy of colonization by penetrating all levels and arenas of 
the public sector with party-nominated appointees.
15
 Precisely the deep and extensive party 
colonization of the state created the conditions for the development of corrupt networks.
16
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Party finance and campaign funding was totally unregulated before 1974 when the 
discovery of extensive corruption produced the Law 195/1974. However, by maintaining the 
system of parliamentary immunity from prosecution, making legal contributions very difficult 
because of strict and cumbersome provisions and introducing a procedure for the publication of 
party accounts that provided for neither transparency nor an effective scrutiny of party finances, 
the Law 195/1974 did little to restrain the expansion of well-established practices of financing 
from kickbacks. It just established a system of public contribution for parties complementing 
illicit private financing. Within this context marked by the partisan colonization of the state, the 
anti-corruption approach has relied only on the repression side. In the absence of a preventive 
framework, the drivers for anti-corruption measures have been limited to law enforcement, 
prosecution, the judiciary and the Court of Audit. 
 
Public Attitudes 
 
Public attitudes and public concerns are expected to influence both the party financing 
and anticorruption policies when the spark of scandals put the issue of reform on the agenda.
17
 
The widespread political corruption scandals that emerged after the 1990s had a pronounced 
effect on Italy’s public opinion. This is evidenced in the sharp decline in the Italians’ levels of 
trust towards representative institutions. 
[Figure 9.1 about here] 
 
While traditionally lower as compared to other countries in Western Europe,
18
 Eurobarometer 
survey data (figure 1) reveals how Italian respondents have lower levels of trust as compared to 
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Western European average, and how the distance between Italian and West European average 
scores has increased over time, accounting in the two latest surveys respectively for 12 and 12.2 
percentage points difference.
19
 The decline in trust is in line with trends revealed by a number of 
additional indicators, such as election turnout and volatility measures, accounting under the 
political elections of 2013 respectively the lowest and the highest figures in the history of the 
Italian Republic.
20
  
Yet, while corruption scandals undoubtedly determined the emergence of negative public 
opinion, political elites perceived little social pressure for introducing policy reforms. Indeed, 
while widespread corruption scandals has brought about increasing disenchantment towards 
representative political institutions and growing mistrust towards party representatives, the 
endemic and enduring corruption problems that the country has continued to face have caused 
processes of “habituation” or “saturation” with regard to the corruption phenomena.
21
 An Italian 
social scientist suggested the “pill metaphor” as explanation, suggesting that the frequency of 
inquiries and legal notifications decrease on the long run the citizens’ attention, similarly to pills 
which become less effective the more they are taken.
22
 Thus, not only the level of public interest 
for news on bribery has decreased, but scandalization thresholds have risen. All in all, it appears 
that negative public attitudes have remained for a long time confined at the social level and did 
therefore not constitute an effective pressure for the established political elites. As mentioned in 
the previous section in fact, despite the intensity of political scandals anti-corruption did not 
become a salient feature of the newly established party system. It was only after the more recent 
scandals, and in a context marked by the emergence of a harsh economic crisis, that social 
discontent overtly challenged the institutional level-elites, with the emergence of the ‘Five Star 
Movement’. 
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Patterns of Political Competition 
 
The fixed governmental formula which had characterized Italy from the end of the 
Second World War until 1994 has been discussed as among the factors having favored hidden 
political exchanges, and hence as one of the most important causes of Italy’s corruption.
23
 The 
establishment of a new party system, with new or substantially reformed political parties, and the 
opportunity provided to Italian voters, for the first time in the country’s political history, to 
“throw the rascals out” from the government, appear as positive predictors of patterns of reform. 
And yet, a more careful consideration of the new party system dynamics reveals a more 
cumbersome picture.  
First, ideological polarization, a salient feature of the Italian “first” Republic,
24
 has 
continued to play a pivotal role in structuring the post-1990s new party system. Both old and 
newly formed political parties used the previous left-right ideological polarization to capture 
voters, placing themselves along traditional political axes.
25
 The historical significance of 
ideological polarization in structuring voting choices of the Italian electorate, on turn reinforced 
by the anti-communist appeals of Mr. Silvio Berlusconi, leader of the newly founded party Forza 
Italia, prevented anti-corruption issues to constitute as a significant new cleavage at the 
institutional level. Indeed, while the country did experience the emergence of several new single 
issue parties, lists and movements, self-profiling mainly against corruption, until the most recent 
parliamentary elections their electoral incidence revealed quite limited. It was only after a new 
wave of corruption scandals emerged in the 2010s, in a context which has been hit hard by the 
global economic crisis since 2008, and possibly as the consequence of left-right ideological 
polarization having ultimately disappeared, that a new party, the ‘Five Star Movement’, managed 
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to bring party financing and anticorruption policies in the heart of the institutional agenda.
26
 A 
second essential characteristic of the post-1994 party system resides in the enduring 
fragmentation of the party system, despite the unprecedented shift towards a bipolar pattern of 
wholesale alternation in government. Indeed overall bipolar, fragmentation determined 
opportunities for conflict within coalitions, leaving unaltered the power of minority vetoes, thus 
weakening the capacity of implementing reform proposals.
27
  
Finally, another highly relevant factor to be taken into consideration with respect to the 
Italian case is the rise of Silvio Berlusconi as the key leader of the center-right coalition: not only 
Mr. Berlusconi has been facing several corruption charges, but in relation to political finance he 
could rely on the resources of the companies under his control in the formation of a party as a 
personal business firm.
28
 Additionally, the polarization of the debate around Mr. Berlusconi 
signaled a momentous change in the relationship between the judiciary and politics, determining 
polarization over the role of the judiciary. Hence, while the center-right coalition focused on the 
need to reform a judiciary it considered too politicized and too powerful, the center-left coalition 
displayed a greater concern for legality focusing its anti-corruption approach on the repression 
side.
29
  
 
Italy’s Responses: Introducing Reforms?  
 
In the following analysis of anti-corruption reform processes we identify six main periods 
characterizing the Italian political cycles from 1992 until 2013: the transition years (1992-1996); 
the centre-left governments of the XIII legislature (1996-2001); the centre-right governments of 
the XIV legislature (2001-2006); the centre-left government of the XV legislature (2006-2008); 
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the centre-right government of the XVI legislature (2008-2011); the grand coalition governments 
of the XVI and XVII legislature (2011-2013). 
In order to present the broader reform context, however, it is important to also consider 
the supranational dimension, and how it contributed to shaping the Italian policy environment. 
Indeed, pressures for reform from both governmental and non-governmental international 
organizations have become increasingly relevant for growing range of national policy areas
30
 
and the fields of corruption and party funding are not an exception. Table 1 summarizes the main 
initiatives developed at the supranational level in the time frame under consideration. 
[Table 9.1 about here] 
 
As shown by the table, since 1997, Italian political elites have faced rising pressure from 
international organizations such as the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, Council of Europe, European Commission, United Nations and the G-20 which 
have been acquiring an increasingly more relevant role as “integrity warriors”, key players of the 
“global movement against corruption”.
31
 International organizations recommended strengthening 
the anticorruption framework as well as balancing the anti-corruption burden which had been 
falling almost exclusively on the law enforcement side.
32
 Italian governments signed the most 
important anticorruption international agreements but ratified them with consistent delay due to 
political bickering over the introduction of measures bringing legislation in line with 
mechanisms for curbing corruption advocated at the supranational level.  
With regard to political finance, international pressures have been less intense since there 
are no international agreements demanding the implementation of specific measures. However, 
also in relation to political finance, the EU has been defining standards and international 
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guidelines since the early 2000s, and has been conducting a major evaluation of domestic 
regulation in the context of the Council of Europe-Group of States against Corruption. 
 
1992-1996 
 
As the Clean Hands investigations started revealing a widespread and deeply rooted 
system of corruption, the Italian institutional political landscape characterized by a period of 
profound political and economic crisis. Until 1994, government coalitions were still held by the 
traditional parties of the First Republic. Scholars observed how policies appeared more focused 
on self-discharge rather than the adoption of coherent anti-corruption policies.
33
  
Yet, under what would become the first of the ‘technical’ governments that Italy experienced 
(the government led by Mr. Ciampi), a number of important reforms were introduced in 
corruption sensitive areas. For example, relevant efforts were made in the area of public 
administration, with the introduction of a Code of Conduct of public personnel, the introduction 
of transparency in public procurement processes (l.109/1994), and the adoption of internal 
systems of control.  
More substantial changes were introduced in the political finance legislation. Soon after a 
referendum held in 1993 which abolished direct public funding of political parties – “the highest 
manifestation of popular rejection of the old party-system”, as Bardi argued,
34
 a new law aiming 
at greater transparency over the political parties’ financial management and prevention of hidden 
corrupt exchanges, was approved. The law introduced maximum ceilings for election expenses, 
maximum ceilings for natural and legal persons’ donations, and established the duty for political 
parties to disclose information on expenditure and income, from both legal and natural persons. 
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Additionally, for the first time, a system of external controls over the political parties’ financial 
activities was introduced (previously under (partisan) control of the Presidents of the two 
Chambers of Parliament). All in all, and despite the limited powers that the newly established 
controlling agencies had in terms of investigation and sanctions enforcement, the new law 
constituted an attempt to curb illicit financing of political actors and illicit use of public money.  
 
1996-2001 
 
The pattern of political instability continued between 1996 and 2001, with the succession of four 
different governments. The first one, formed after the center-left coalition led by Romano Prodi 
won the 1996 political elections, collapsed after intra-coalition disagreements. The remaining 
three followed between 1998 and 2001. During this period, the theme of corruption entered for 
the first time in the political agenda in a more sustained way.
35
 Hence, two research 
Commissions were established at the Chamber of Deputies in 1996, both with the objective to 
advance policy proposals that would have strengthened corruption prevention and enhanced 
public administration accountability.
36
  
Yet, despite heightened attention, few of the proposals that had been advanced by those 
commissions became implemented by law. The few anticorruption measures that were approved 
include law 97/2001, which introduced a loose link between disciplinary sanctions on public 
officials and acts of corruption; and laws 165/2001 and 267/2000 laying out a loose 
incompatibility framework and providing the public personnel rotation. Other measures, such as 
the new Code of Conduct, the public management reform and administrative simplifications, did 
either lack effective sanctions for any violation of its provisions,
37
 or they displayed an 
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implementation gap.
38
 The parliamentary discussion was polarized around the harshly debated 
proposal promoted by Antonio Di Pietro, a leading judge of the Clean Hands investigations who 
later became a political leader in the center left coalition, The debate was in regards to the 
establishment of a “law enforcement type” specialized anticorruption institution which 
contrasted to the preventive and policy coordination framework advocated by the research 
commissions. This polarization implied a stalemate which had a negative impact on the 
anticorruption policy since it hindered the establishment of an anticorruption body designed to 
coordinate the prevention framework.  Further, most of the political elites did not exhibit alacrity 
in elaborating a preventive framework as they were much more interested in reproducing 
colonization of the state by means of patronage appointments.
39
 
As opposed to the tentative reforms in the field of administrative corruption, the changes 
in political finance legislation taking place between 1996 and 2001 appear mostly centered on 
increasing the amount of financial resources for political parties and widening the number of 
beneficiaries. Law 2/1997, adopted in short time and with wide consensus (422 in favour, 31 
abstentions and only 13 against), provided an additional channel for party funding, introducing 
the option for citizens of allocating 4 per cent of their personal income tax for the funding of 
political parties. Concretely, this implied the reintroduction of public funding of the ordinary 
activities of political parties abolished by the 1993 referendum. The failure of this system for 
increasing the parties’ revenues stimulated the adoption of a second law in 1999, which 
heightened the amount of funds available for election reimbursement and lowered the eligibility 
threshold from 3 to 1 per cent of the votes.
40
 
In terms of policies contrasting financial misdemeanours by political parties and 
candidates, this period experienced a return to the past. Indeed, the 1997 law abrogated the 
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requirement, previously in force (L. 659/1981, art. 4, co. 13), that internal control of the parties’ 
balance sheets should be performed by professional accountants with a minimum of five-year 
experience, thus leaving the nomination of internal accountants unregulated. Additionally, the 
1997 law introduced a new organ, the Board of Auditors, with the task of verifying the accuracy 
and legal compliance of the political parties’ annual financial statements. Noticeably, the Board 
is based in the Chamber of Deputies, and the five auditors composing it are appointed by the 
Presidents of the two Italian Chambers, thus restoring de facto the partisanship of controlling 
organs. 
  
2001-2006  
 
In the first half of the 2000s, international pressures intensified with regard to both anti-
corruption policies and political finance regulation. However, the new center-right government 
formed after the political elections of 2001 did not introduce reforms in the direction urged by 
international organizations in neither area.
41
 While an Anticorruption High Commissioner was 
established in 2003 – following calls from OECD and UN – with a mandate to investigate the 
causes of corruption, assess the legal frameworks, and monitor expenditure procedures, it only 
became operative in 2005 and endowed with limited resources. Thus, three are the relevant anti-
corruption policies introduced in this period: Law 163/2006, enhancing the transparency of 
public procurement; the Legislative Decree 231/2001 that implemented the 1997 OECD Anti-
Bribery Convention, criminalizing the corruption of foreign officials and introducing the liability 
of companies for bribery; the Law 215/2004 enacted to provide restrictions and to define 
incompatibilities and conflicts of interest. However, the latter provision lacking in effective 
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sanction as it was driven by the questionable motive of providing for permissive legislation 
regulating the presence of an entrepreneur such as Berlusconi among the ranks of executive 
politicians.
42
 Other laws potentially enhancing corruption were passed that were highly 
advantageous to Berlusconi’s private interest as they provided legal safeguards for the Prime 
Minister against pending judicial inquiries ranging from: Law 61/2002 decriminalizing false 
accounting from which businesses can extract money for bribes; Law 140/2003 providing for the 
suspension, ruled unconstitutional, of criminal proceedings for holders of the highest state 
offices; and Law 251/2005 reducing the time limit specified in the statute of limitations.
43
 
Impermeability towards international pressures equally reveal with respect to political 
finance legislation. Contrarily to the international standards that had developed in these very 
years, legal provisions were overtly used to increase the amount of state funding that political 
parties benefited from for a longer time-span. Indeed, an amendment was introduced providing 
the reimbursement for a full (five years) legislature even in the event of the early dissolution of 
the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. This implied that in case of early dissolution of the 
legislature (which indeed took place in 2008), political parties would have funding for both the 
election expenses incurred for the previous and for the current legislature. In sum, it implied a 
doubling of the funds relating to the two Chambers. Additionally, the established ceiling for 
disclosing private donations is substantially raised (set at approximately eight times higher), thus 
decreasing transparency of the political parties’ financial management. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  17
2006-2008 
 
Between 2006 and 2008, when the center-left led by Romano Prodi won the elections, no 
significant anti-corruption reforms were introduced. Further, center-left coalition politicized the 
High Commissioner as the appointment of well-known prefects was motivated by the need to 
reassure leftist voters about credible commitment to law enforcement. However, what took place 
was a symbolic action since the capacity of the High Commissioner was not strengthened to 
fulfil its mandate.  No changes were introduced with respect to political finance legislation, 
except for a 10 per cent lowering of election reimbursements to political parties as a reaction to 
the first signs of growing popular discontent.   
All in all, the very narrow majority supporting the Prodi government in the Senate and its 
heterogeneous composition made it difficult to have a coherent and ambitious anticorruption 
policy. Therefore, before its early resignation in February 2008 the Prodi government was 
capable only of joining the Council of Europe’s Groups of States against Corruption (GRECO) 
in June 2007. 
 
2008-2011 
 
The new Berlusconi government, formed in 2008, reacted to the center left politicization 
of the High Commissioner by suppressing the agency and entrusting its competencies to the 
Anticorruption and Transparency Service - SAET, a simple office of the Public Administration 
Department, lacking any requirement of autonomy as prescribed by the UNCAC ratified through 
Law 116/2009. 
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The mounting international pressure, provoked by the absence of any plausible response 
to corruption, forced the Berlusconi government to establish a new agency, the Commission of 
Evaluation, Integrity and Transparency (CIVIT) in 2009. Identifying transparency and integrity 
as key drivers of administrative reform, the government provided total disclosure on raw data 
regarding public management for strengthening pressure against maladministration, inefficiency 
and bribery, and launching a series of initiatives under the banner of “Transparency Operation.” 
As a matter of fact, in the first stage CIVIT suffered from the same difficult building process of 
the High Commissioner, since it started its job at the very end of 2009 endowed with limited 
resources. The institutionalization of CIVIT was further complicated by the resignations of two 
of the five original components whose substitutions, given the complex nomination procedure, 
ended only in December 2011. 
Additionally, as a reaction to the international pressures, in March 2010 the Council of 
Ministers approved an Anticorruption Bill which proposed an Anticorruption National Plan and 
an Anticorruption Network. However, the Anti-Corruption Bill was not approved until the 
formation of the Monti government. Yet again, under the Berlusconi government the conflict 
between the executive and the judiciary intensified, as a new provision providing criminal 
immunity for the highest offices of the state was approved (l.124/2008), and a year later ruled 
unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court. 
As for the previous political cycle, no changes were introduced for what political finance 
is concerned, except for two measures: the abolishment of the full reimbursement in the event of 
the early dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, and another lowering of public 
funding (20 per cent lower).   
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2011-2013 
 
As the Berlusconi government proved unable to counteract the effects of the global economic 
crisis and to reverse the path of faltering legitimacy of the political class fuelled by a number of 
corruption allegations, a new technical government formed in the late 2011 under the former EU 
Competition Commissioner Mr. Mario Monti. With the stated objective to support the restoration 
of markets’ and citizens’ trust in the Italian government, the new government put the 
anticorruption policy at the center of its agenda.
44
 Indeed, among its first initiatives, the Italian 
government ratified the Council of Europe Criminal and Civil Law Conventions on Corruption 
through law. 110/2012 and 112/2012. The Monti government was keen to meeting the requests 
of international organizations such as the European Commission, which launched in summer 
2011 the EU Anti-Corruption Report to monitor and assess member states’ efforts in this area, 
and the GRECO, which issued the Third Evaluation Report on the Transparency of Party 
Funding highlighting major shortcomings of the Italian regulatory system.
45
 
By exploiting the sense of urgency associated with the economic and legitimacy crisis, 
the Monti government was capable of forcing the resistance of the center-right wing of the 
coalition, using a vote of confidence in Parliament to approve the Anticorruption Law 190/2012 
which built on the previous Anticorruption Bill proposed by the Berlusconi government. While 
the previous bill did not addressed major shortcomings highlighted in monitoring reports by 
international organizations, the Anticorruption Law was meant to bring Italian legislation in line 
with its international commitments.  The approval of the Anti-Corruption Law constituted a true 
turning point since it allowed the Monti government to adopt in a very brief span of time two 
important legislative decrees concerning, respectively, the strengthening of publication 
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requirements, transparency and disclosure of information by public administration (33/2013) and 
incompatibility regarding administrative positions (39/2013), complemented by the new code of 
conduct for public personnel (DPR 62/2013). The Anticorruption law provided for the first time 
in Italian legislation whistleblower protection for those who expose corrupt conduct. 
Furthermore, the whole administrative system was involved in an Anticorruption National Plan 
that triggered the adoption of Anticorruption Prevention Plans to embed corruption risk 
management within public management in each public administration and public entities, that 
should even introduce a new specific organizational position responsible of the anticorruption 
prevention, designated for monitoring anticorruption measures. The new law also partly 
addressed the lack of coordination mechanisms by making CIVIT the national independent 
anticorruption authority in line with the provisions of the UNCAC. However, the short mandate 
of the Monti government prevented the agency’s institutionalization from taking roots as no 
additional resources were allocated to enforce the new powers with regard to the control of the 
implementation of anticorruption measure, raising concerns that the CIVIT might be 
overburdened.
46
 
The Monti technical government did also provide smooth responses to GRECO’s 
evaluation report on Italy, introducing a new political finance law in July 2012 (Law 92/2012). 
This act is significant as it addressed many of the shortcomings underlined by GRECO. 
Important amendments were introduced in relation to the corruption sensitive areas of 
transparency, disclosure and control. The most relevant changes introduced with respect to 
political corruption are the establishment of a system of internal and external controls over the 
parties’ financial management. As to the former, the law repealed the changes introduced by law 
2/1997, requiring internal control to be performed by qualified state-recognised auditors. As to 
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the latter, it established a new independent commission at the Court of Audit, providing it with 
powers of investigation. Under the same act, the ceiling for disclosure of donations to political 
parties was lowered substantially, thus allowing for greater financial transparency over political 
parties’ sources of income. Finally, this law introduced a new system of ‘co-financing’, based on 
which 30 per cent of the total amount of funding to political parties would have been disbursed 
in relation to the income derived from membership fees and donations. This measure would have 
allowed reducing the political parties’ state dependency, and would have encouraged them to 
promote their linkages with civil society.
47
 
However, the Monti government did not last long, and the new political elections that 
took place in 2013 generated a new phase of political instability, comparable for high volatility 
records to the one of the early 1990s, marked by the success of the ‘Five Star Movement’ that 
eventually led to the constitution of the Letta government based on the fragile parliamentary 
support of a “grand coalition”. The shift from a technical to a political government altered 
dramatically the political context in which the corruption prevention provisions were 
implemented. Given its status as a technician who had not been previously involved in politics, 
Monti could attempt to promote the integrity of public officials since he was not worried about 
being targeted by anticorruption mechanisms. Conversely, the Letta government was not 
committed to implement the legislative decree 39/2013 regulating incompatibility and conflicts 
of interest since it would have had a negative impact on the Italian political class. Thus, when the 
CIVIT displayed a zealous approach to the implementation of the anticorruption framework by 
disposing the total and immediate application of the legislative decree,
48
 the Letta government 
reacted by adopting Law 98/2013 which reversed the CIVIT decision and moved the 
interpretative power from the agency to the Ministry of Public Administration. The autonomy of 
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the agency was further curtailed by Law 125/2013 which changed the name of CIVIT to Anti-
Corruption National Authority (ANAC) and enlarged the composition of its board from 3 to 5 so 
as to provide for  new nomination. 
As for political finance reform, the growing popular discontent with established parties 
found an electorally challenging interlocutor in the Five Stars Movement, which started an active 
campaign for the repeal of public funding to political parties. This party’s exceptional electoral 
success in the political elections of 2013 brought a growing number of established political 
actors to adopt anti-public funding stances, ultimately leading to the adoption of yet another 
political finance law (Law Decree 149/2013). The repeal of public funding to political parties, 
which makes Italy become the only country in Europe where state subsidies have been abolished, 
leads to a paradox: while responding towards civil society discontent, it ignores 
recommendations from international organizations. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Heywood observed how “effectively, the Italian example produced a ‘demonstration 
effect’, sensitizing other western democracies to the issue of political corruption”, and 
“prompting anti-corruption drives in several states.” 
49
 Yet, while exporting this sensibility 
abroad, Italy is found at the highest end of the West European continuum with regard to both the 
frequency of political corruption and the scale of political scandals,
50
 and the Italian 
governments’ disposition in tackling corruption with coherent and effective measures appears 
very limited.  
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This goes against expectations raised by the abrupt political change in the early 1990s. 
After 1990 corruption scandals, some conditions for the adoption of anti-corruption policies were 
favorable: government alternation was for the first time introduced in Italy, and political 
corruption scandals made the public become alert and attentive. Additionally, both policy areas 
have been subject to a growing supranational pressure. In this chapter we argued that a more 
nuanced understanding of the factors accounting for government disposition towards reforms is 
warranted.  First, while the bi-polar tendency and government alternation were introduced, 
elections did not act as counterweights. Party system dynamics remained characterized by 
polarization, fragmentation, veto powers, patronage appointments of top state positions, leading 
to the persistence of government instability problems and to their short duration, which on turn 
hampered the establishment of a coherent and consistent program of reforms. Second, until more 
recently, corruption scandals did not determine strong civil society pressures on political elites: 
due to “habituation” to corruption phenomena, scandalization thresholds have heightened. It was 
only after the more recent economic crisis and a new wave of corruption scandals that societal 
pressures rose again, this time finding a newly formed institutional interlocutor, the “Five Star 
Movement,” which profiled itself strongly against corruption as well as against the established 
political elites.   
Throughout the twenty years’ time span from the ‘Bribesville’ investigations, several 
changes have been introduced in both the anti-corruption and the political finance reform areas. 
In less than two decades, three anti-corruption agencies have been established, two major 
transparency initiatives have been launched,  two codes of conduct for public personnel have 
been introduced, the incompatibility regime has been reviewed twice; on political finance, eight 
legislative amendments have been introduced, changing the nature and the functions of the 
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authorities controlling the parties’ financial management, disclosure and transparency measures, 
amending procedures for public funding disbursement and their thresholds, and ultimately 
repealing it. However, all this gives the impression of reactions and counter-reactions rather than 
a coherent and consistent anti-corruption reforms program. The overall pattern that can be 
observed with respect to the Italian governments’ disposition towards anti-corruption policy 
reforms since the 1990s is one of incremental change: policy changes have been developed 
occasionally and unevenly, disguising substantial continuity as they lacked effective 
implementation.  
Noticeably, in the two areas that we examined, reforms have followed a different path. 
Supranational influences have revealed to be particularly relevant for the introduction of 
legislative provisions aimed at preventing corruption. While in the early 1990s the Italian 
approach had relied on criminal legislation to curb corruption, greater consideration for 
preventive mechanisms revealed in the 2000s, concomitantly to the intensification of 
international pressures which reached its peak when the Italian government launched 
anticorruption legislation as a part of its response to the economic crisis. However, even after the 
adoption of the Anticorruption law, major gaps and shortcomings in the public integrity 
framework remain. First, anti-corruption provisions are still missing in the private sector. 
Second, the legislation remains unclear on the application of prevention mechanisms with regard 
to the panoply of public corporations which constitute the privileged site of corrupt exchanges.  
Third, provisions regulating conflicts of interest with regard to elected politicians need to be 
strengthened. Fourth, anticorruption initiatives should be linked to more general reforms aimed 
at preventing corruption indirectly by improving the overall quality of public management as 
envisaged by the administrative reforms launched in the 1990s.  Finally, the implementation gap 
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of the new prevention mechanisms should be addressed by effective communication, 
stakeholders’ involvement and capacity building under the coordination of an independent and 
well-resourced anticorruption agency.  
Pressure from above played a more marginal role instead in shaping political finance 
reforms. Even though supranational organizations have been providing increasing attention to 
political finance legislation throughout this very last decade and have solicited national member 
states to take on board a growing number of recommendations in the field of public funding 
provision, transparency, control and oversight, it is only in 2012, after that GRECO issued a 
highly critical report on Italy’s political finance regime, that supranational influences permeated 
the national debate. However, while the reform adopted immediately after the report appears 
(partially) influenced by it, the 2014 counter-reform that abolished public funding to political 
parties goes overtly against supranational recommendations. Indeed, the latter encourage forms 
of direct state funding to political parties: not only they level the playing field of electoral 
competition, allowing parties to compete on more equal grounds, but they also help preventing 
the parties’ excessive reliance on private, potentially corruptive, donors. Comparative research 
has in fact widely shown that the lack of public funding to be correlate with opportunities for 
corporations and wealthy individuals to “capture” the state policy-making capacities.
51
  The 
Italian legislator instead, in a context of enduring economic crisis, growing electoral uncertainty, 
and growing anti-elites pressures, preferred to throw out the baby with the bath water: rather than 
introducing a more comprehensive and internally coherent regulation with respect to all main 
political finance areas (i.e.: regulation of income, expenditure, reporting, control, sanctions), it 
abolished direct public funding tout court. 
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All in all, what seems to be needed is not a set of reforms and measures, but the establishment of 
a consensus concerning what is appropriate and what are the limits of the tolerated. Unless this 
takes root, the future of anti-corruption policies appears still very uncertain.  
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